

Address to Summer Only Employees by
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
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Good afternoon. I feel like I'm with the family here because you're all part of the family. We're pleased to have you a special part of the family this summer in being here on the job and really getting a better feel for what someone else in your family has been doing for many, many years which you have indirectly been supporting. There is no Agency in the United States Government that asks more sacrifice, more support from the families of its employees than does the Central Intelligence Agency. So I start by thanking you because you have supported the Agency for many years and you're doing more of it this summer. We are pleased to have you here, we're pleased that a little less than half of you are here for the second time and we hope that many of you will be with us again next year.

You are scattered this summer in 29 different offices in the Agency; 281 of you altogether. For the secondtimers, I hope that you are in a different office than the last time so that you spread your knowledge and experience in the Agency. But even so, there are difficulties for you, I am sure, in trying to grasp the totality of what CIA does as you sit in one of these 29 or maybe, in your second go-round, a second office here. So let me take just a couple of minutes to give you an overview of what we are doing, what the different elements of the Agency are expected to do in performing our mission, and then mainly I am going to try to set aside time to hear from you--get your thoughts, your ideas or try to respond to your questions.

Intelligence is a three-fold process. We do three things--we produce foreign intelligence, information about what is going on in the rest of the world; we carry out covert actions, which are to influence events in other parts of the world without it being apparent who is doing the influencing; and we conduct counterintelligence, that is, we protect ourselves from other intelligence services around the world doing what we call penetrating us--finding out what's going on, putting a spy in our midst.

Our primary task, the most important one and the one that consumes the greater part of our resources, is producing foreign intelligence. You do that first by collecting data--information--and second, by analyzing it, bringing it into some form where you can draw conclusions from it and disseminating it to our policymakers who make decisions based on it. How do we collect it? There are two basic ways--technical means and human means. Some of you work in the DDS&T--that is our technical shop--Science and Technology. They work in the technical systems for photographs largely from satellites. They work in the technical system of intercepting signals. All of you know that if you had your transistor radio with you and you held it up in here you would get a signal, right? There are lots of other signals probably passing through this room right now--radar signals, telemetry signals,

communications signals, altimeter signals, one thing or another. And our job, which the DDS&T is very ingenious at, is figuring out how to get an antenna and then hook it up to a receiver in the right place to get the right signal at the right time. There are lots of these to be had. Some of them are signals that only emanate a few feet, some of them go halfway around the world. The problem of getting the antenna in the right place is obviously a very different, very interesting challenge and the DDS&T does a great deal in that area.

Human intelligence tries to fill in what you cannot get by these other means. We would like to get it by technical means because it is less risky, sometimes more costly--satellites are tremendously expensive for instance and some of the signals intercepts systems are too--but human intelligence is risky. The DDO is our human intelligence activity. It is a question of being able to induce people who live and work in foreign countries to appreciate that they can have an interest in supporting the United States. And we often get people who really do understand that what we are trying to do for them and for the world, is really in their own country's best interests. It's difficult, it's risky as I have said, but it is essential to have a good intelligence capability because there are things that people do not write down or do not send in signals or do not expose to where you can get a photograph of it. Primarily, what are they thinking about? What are their plans, what are their intentions? What are they going to do to next? And that is where the human intelligence agent comes in.

Now covert action is conducted largely by the DDO. Covert action is, for instance, if we put out a propaganda broadcast on the U.S. Information Service that is run by the State Department, everybody knows, of course, it came out of the United States and it says the Russians are bad guys in Afghanistan. And those who read it and hear about it say, well, you know, that may be biased because the United States is putting that out and they want us to think that and it is for their purposes. So sometimes we in the covert action field can arrange to put something like that out into dissemination either man-to-man, in newspapers, or radio broadcasts without it being known that it is the United States that is putting that view forward. Now between you and me, what we put out is almost always exactly what is really happening, but sometimes it has more credence when it doesn't have the United States' label on it. So there is a real function for covert action. I'm sure that your friends, when you tell them you work in the CIA, talk to you about [redacted] Iran and other more dramatic covert actions of our past, ones that we do not renounce for the future. It is a capability influencing politics of a country that we have to retain because, on the one hand, you can go to war and tell people, order them what you want them to do. I mean if they don't follow you, you go to war and force them to do it. On the other hand, you can try to persuade them through diplomacy, through negotiation and so on. In between here, is the covert action where you try to accomplish what is a necessary national objective by means that are not attributable to the United States.

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Counterintelligence again rests largely in the DDO. And that is a matter of scrutinizing everything we do and how we do it to be sure that we are not providing on a platter to the Soviets or others, an opportunity to discern what we are up to, or not protecting ourselves against that very surreptitious activity of trying to penetrate us by espionage techniques. Now, to carry out any of these three functions--foreign intelligence--I'm sorry. I left out of foreign intelligence one of the most important elements. After you get all that information, you have got to do something with it, and that is the NFAC job of analyzing it, pulling it together and turning it into one of our several forms of intelligence product. We have a real university research center here for those of you who are not working in the NFAC, and in that NFAC we have almost all of the academic skills that you will find in universities in our country and many, many PhD's and Masters degrees, as well as Bachelor's Degrees, and it is their job to take all these clues that come in from signals intelligence, photos and human intelligence, and put them all together because seldom, if ever, is a piece of intelligence that is collected absolutely conclusive. If you have a photograph, you may say that's a water pitcher and you know it's a water pitcher. If you only have a photograph of it how do you know it's not a bomb also? If you get a report from a human agent, can you really trust it? Not because he may be lying to you, because maybe he is, he may be a double agent, but maybe he really didn't understand the situation or maybe he sort of elaborated on it a little bit and made something up while he was writing his report to you. If you hear a signal and you hear somebody say something, that is very conclusive evidence except maybe he is not telling the truth or doesn't understand exactly what is going on himself. So, the analyst has to factor all that together, try to get a couple of clues that bear on the same situation and then come up with some explanation of what is going on in the economic sphere, political sphere, military sphere, scientific and technical development sphere and so on. Really a tremendously challenging task that the NFAC has.

Now let me go on. We do foreign intelligence, we do covert action and we do counterintelligence but we only do them because we have a lot of support around here that is essential to these activities. Much of that support is in the Directorate of Administration, the DDA. We have to communicate with all of our offices in the field. They run the communications. They are closely related to the counterintelligence in having the Office of Security. All of you have been through the Office of Security's screening if you work here. They handle data processing, they handle the medical support for our people and they have an office called Logistics which arranges to get the kinds of things that our people in the field need to them at the right place at the right time.

On top of that we have a series of smaller, independent offices who provide essential support to all of these activities. For instance,

we have a General Counsel's office. Any of you who are aspiring to be lawyers in the long run should do a summer's work there, for instance, and see what it is like. Today, in this country, whether it's in intelligence or politics or business, you can hardly move two steps without talking to your lawyer, and it happens here too. And it is very important to us because we have certain laws, certain regulations that govern our activities and quite properly so because we have a very delicate responsibility and a very democratic society and yet we are a very secretive organization. So all that combination means that there has to be a certain amount of control on what we do and our lawyers are the ones who give us our advice on whether we are adhering to those laws and it is most important that we do so. We have an Office of Legislative Counsel. We are a democracy. The Congress plays a very big part in all of the governmental activities, including ours. And we must get our money from the Congress and we must go up and discuss it and we must also provide service to the Congress, give them the product of the NFAC and help them understand what is going on in the world so they can make good decisions up there as well as in the Executive Branch.

We have an Office of Public Affairs. In the last five or six years, this Agency has, many think unfortunately, and I think it is unfortunate, become much more of a public institution. I also happen to think there is no way to turn that clock back. We are too large a part of American society to be completely hidden in this democratic atmosphere in which we live. So we have a Public Affairs Office that tries to sort out and be sure that we only release what can be released, that we provide that amount of information to the public and that we carefully not talk about those things which cannot be talked about without hurting our capability to perform our roles.

We have an Inspector General who overlooks what we are doing, conducts inspections, tries to see how things are being done. He is sort of my eyes and ears to help me keep a finger on what is going on in the Agency as a whole.

We have an Office of Personnel Policy Planning and Management. Twenty-one of you are working there. We have recently elevated it from being a part of one of the directorates to being an independent office that reports directly to me and it is because the future of this Agency, more than maybe almost any other element of the government, rests on the quality of people that we have and, therefore, we are paying very great attention to the policies, the management tools, the recruiting techniques so that we get and retain in this organization, the same very high quality of people that we have had for many, many years.

We have an Office of Comptroller. Again, there is nothing you can do without money so we have one office that handles all the money, develops our budget, divides it up, sees how we spend it and so on.

All of these elements have to tie together into one big team. I have described them separately but they are all very closely interrelated. If the DDS&T does not develop new equipments for the human intelligence people to do their job, they won't be very good four or five years from now, for instance. If they don't explore new analytic techniques, both in DDS&T and in the NFAC, we are going to be out of date in a few years and not be able to do the job. If our communications don't keep abreast of the times, we'll have all kinds of information over there someplace and it won't be here in a manner that can let us use it to good advantage, and so on. And so we try at my level and through something called an Executive Committee, which are all the top managers of the Agency, to be a team, to be a family and to work together in very close coordination. Sometimes that is not easy because we also have this great need for secrecy. We don't want you, or you, or you to know anything that you don't really need to know to do your job. Not that we don't trust you, but that the proliferation of information, more than is necessary, is just not good practice in an organization that requires secrecy; because it isn't that you are not trustworthy, it is that inadvertent leak. That inadvertent comment. Or that reaction that you may give before you know what you have done that gives away something. And so we have a very delicate problem in the Central Intelligence Agency of balancing the sharing of information so that we work together as a team and the holding of information tight so that we don't have leaks that will spoil our ability to continue doing what we are doing. You cannot persuade an agent to risk his life for you in taking a photograph of a secret document inside some other country's headquarters if he thinks his name is going to appear in the Washington Post one of these days. So we do have a real need for secrecy. I would say to you in all sincerity it is one of our biggest problems today. We are working very hard to close down on that without closing off the flow of information that is necessary to keep us working together as one team. I am really pleased that you are part of that team this summer, that you are getting some better feel for what the Agency is and how it works and I hope you are enjoying your summer and I hope all of you will come back one way or another in the future.